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A SOCIOLOGICAL VIEW OF 
RELIGION 
BY PROFESSOR H. BOIS 
THE recent publication in an English translation of 
Professor Durkheim’s study of the Elementary Forms of the 
Religious Life’ affords an opportunity for a brief considera- 
tion of the modern attempt to explain religion in terms 
of sociology. Although the book in its French form is not 
quite new, it still holds the field as a solid contribution 
representing the views of a most important present-day 
school of thought. It ought specially to arrest the atten- 
tion of missionaries, as the sociological school, of which 
Professor Durkheim is the leader in France, rests its claims 
snd explanations upon sources which are largely missionary, 
and upon religions which missionaries are more fitted than 
anyone else to  study and to  understand. It is needless 
t o  say that if sociological theories were to be accepted 
without qualification, missionaries would perforce have to  
modify to a considerable extent their attitude towards 
these religions in the mission field. 
Professor Durkheim’s object is to study the origin of 
religion. It is a fact estab- 
lished by sociology, and has outlived all its critics and all 
the objections urged against it. It must therefore be 
founded in the nature of things, for it is a sociological law 
that no institution based on falsehood and error can survive. 
Religion has thus its roots in reality and corresponds to  a 
human need. The reasons which explain it may be very 
Religion has a real existence. 
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different from those put forward by believers. Nevertlie- 
less such reabons exist, and it is the business of science t o  
discover them. We ere consequently justified in refusing 
our assent t o  all theories about religion which lead t o  the 
conclusion that  it is a mere illusion. Professor Durkheim 
approaches the question of the origin of religion under 
new conditions which may be briefly described. He niakes 
no attempt to study many religions, but confines his 
attention t o  one-the most simple and primitive that  can 
be known ; a religion, that  is t o  say, found among a people 
whose socinl organization is the simplest yet known, and a 
religion that  does not need for its explanation the help of 
any religion previously existing. The reasons for this 
choice are purely reasons of method. Sociology must study 
simple things before those which are complex. and the 
beginning of an evolution before its final terms. Further, 
before an institution has become complicated i t  is easier 
t o  resolve i t  into its constituent elements. Lastly, since 
in the primitive group individuality is less developed and 
uniformity nearly perfect, it  is easier t o  grasp the nature 
of religion. Mythologies and theologies have not yet done 
their work ; the religious fact still visibly carries the mark 
of its origin. These reasons explain why Durkheirri chooses 
a primitive religion as the object of his study. His choice 
also has the advantage of throwing more light on the 
theory of knowledge which in the present volume forms the 
second subject of the author’s inquiries; the first systems 
of representation were of religious origin. Religion contri- 
buted to form human thought. The essential ideas or 
categories which dominate all our intellectual life and form 
the solid framework of our thinking (ideas of time, space, 
class, number, cause, substance, personality) have their 
birth and origin in religion, according t o  the thesis main- 
tained by Professor Durkheim. And as religion in his 
view is social in its fundamental nature, tile categories of 
thought are also social. The problem of knowledge is 
stated in new terms. The hypothesis of the social origin 
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of these categories, it  is c.laimed, combines the conditions 
of empiricism and apriorism without incurring any of their 
inconveniences. It explains the essential principles of the 
apriorists ; the authority of reason is the very authority of 
society transferring itself t o  a certain manner of thought. 
Durkheim thus proposes to give us two new theories-one of 
the religious life and the other of knowledge. 
Before looking for the most primitive and simple re- 
ligion that can be found, it is necessary to  define what is 
meant by a religion. This definition will help us to  dis- 
tinguish what has a religious character from what has not, 
and it is of great importance in Durkheim’s theory. What 
characteristic qualities are evidence that we have to  do 
with a religion 1 Is it the idea of the supernatural ? No, 
replies Durkheim; this has not played a large part in 
all religions and is a comparatively recent appearance. 
Primitive man does not possess the idea of mystery which 
presupposes the idea of natural laws and of determinism. 
Is it then the idea of divinity 1 The answer again is No, even 
if by belief in divinity we mean belief in spiritual beings 
who cannot properly be called gods. Religion is not the 
belief in spiritual beings, for there are great religions from 
which the idea of gods is absent or in which it holds a 
secondary place-Buddhism, for example, in its essential 
elements, and Jainism. Even in deistic religions there 
are rites which are quite independent of the thought of 
gods and of spiritual beings. Religion goes beyond the 
idea of gods or spirits. We must look elsewhere for its 
essence. Durkheim finds the common characteristic of 
all religions in the classification of all things into two 
opposite groups, which he designates by the terms 
‘ sacred ’ and ‘ profane.’ Rites, gestures, beings, things, 
words, expressions may be sacred. The opposition be- 
tween sacred and profane things does not come from the 
fact that sacred things belong to a class superior in dignity, 
but merely from the fact that they are distinct and separate. 
Another characteristic is necessary to  distinguish religion 
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from magic, and this is the existence of religious churches, 
whereas the practice of magic does not require a church. 
We may therefore define religion as ‘ a  unified system of 
beliefs and practices relative to  sacred things-that is t o  
say, things set apart and forbidden; beliefs and practices 
which unite into one single moral community called a church 
all those who adhere to  them ’ (p. 47). 
With the help of this definition Durkheim sets about 
the search for the elementary religion he desires to study. 
Neither the theory of animism, which finds in dreams the 
first beginning of the evolution of religion, nor the theory 
of naturism, which finds it in certain natural forces, serves 
his purpose, since the germ of the opposition that separates 
the profane from the sacred cannot be found in the nature 
either of man or of the universe. Both these views are 
obliged to admit the existewe of hallucinations and to 
regard religion as a mere illusion. Behind animism and 
naturism there must exist another kind of cult more funda- 
mental and primitive. It is that  which ethnologists have 
called totemism. Totemism was first discovered among 
the aboriginal inhabitants of America. Then Grey pointed 
out its existence in Australia. Sir James Frazer studied 
in i t  1887, and his investigations were followed by 
those of Robertson Smith. The most important works on 
Australian totemism are those of Baldwin, Spencer and 
Gillen, and those of the German missionary Karl Strehlow. 
Professor Durkheim uses them constantly as sources of 
information. He devotes his attention especially t o  
Australian totemism, a method which permits him to  
attain a greater precision. Only occasionally he draws 
facts and illustrations from American totemism, when 
these are able t o  throw fresh light on the subject. 
Totemism cannot be separated from a very primitive 
social organization-organization in clans. The members 
of a clan consider themselves as related to  one another, 
not from the fact of blood connexion but from the fact 
that  they bear the same name. This name is called ‘ totem ’ 
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from a word applied by an Algonquin tribe, the Ojibway, 
and adopted by ethnologists, though it is in no sense 
Australian. The totem belongs to  one clan only, and no 
other clan can bear the same name. It is generally the 
name of some animal or vegetable species. The totem 
is also an emblem, a kind of badge, a coat of arms. Its 
image is reproduced everywhere, drawn on rocks and on 
the earth. The members of the clan cut their hair in such 
a way as to  imitate the external aspect of their totem 
and also tattoo themselves with it. 
It is the 
type of sacred things. Australians make constant use in 
their rites of certain instruments called churingu. The 
churingu are made of wood or of polished stone, generally 
of oval or oblong shape; on them is engraved a design 
representing the totem. They are kept in a sacred place 
which profane people are not allowed to  approach, and 
where wounded animals cannot be killed. They are sacred 
from the mere fact that they bear the emblem of the totem. 
Totemic animals or vegetables are sacred for a similar 
reason; they are not allowed to  be eaten, and this pro- 
hibition is frequently absolute for profane people. The 
individual man himself is also sacred. He is regarded 
as a kinsman of the totemic animal since he bears the 
same name. He believes himself to  be not only a man 
but also a totemic animal or plant. Certain parts of his 
person are especially sacred-blood, which women ought 
not t o  see flowing, and hair, which is used to  make belts 
or fillets for the cult. 
Some scholars believed that they could explain totemism 
by deriving it from animism or naturism, but Professor 
Durkheirn finds these explanations inadequate. Accordingly 
he tries to  explain totemism by itself, and seeks for the 
ideas which gave rise to i t  and have a religious character. 
This brings us to a very important point in Professor 
Durkheim's theory. Thus far he has described various 
beliefs relating to  sacred things ; he now appeals t o  the 
The totem has finally a religious character. 
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notion of an impersonal force which is called mana in 
Melanesia. This idea gives unity t o  totemism and explains 
the sacred character assigned t o  so many different things. 
This sacred character does not come from the things them- 
selves but from a principle common t o  them all, common 
to totem animals as well as t o  the members of the clan. 
The totem cult is fundamentally related t o  this impersonal 
force, which is a kind of god  immanent in the world and 
diffused in an innumerable variety of things. The Aus- 
tralian does not represent these forces as immaterial, but 
gives them a material form of an animal or of a plant. The 
cult which is offered to  tlie totem is offered t o  this force 
through it. The force is both material and moral. It is 
true that  the native does not conceive this manu as clearly 
as we can, but we can find the idea in a developed form 
in societies where the evolution of totemism is more ad- 
vanced. The Iroquois call i t  orenda, the Sioux, wakan; 
they speak of it as if i t  were a supernatural and immaterial 
force which can appear in anything. It may therefore be 
inferred that the idea belongs t o  the spirit of totemism. 
This principle regarded by some tribes as absolutely general 
is in others restricted t o  the clan by a kind of specialization. 
It is the original matter out of which have been constructed 
all gods and spirits. It precedes animism. The principle 
o f  totemism is the first of human religious ideas. 
The idea of mana gives t o  Professor Durkheim the 
explanation of totemism. The problem of the origin of 
totemism is thus the problem of the origin of munu. How 
and out of what materials have men been led t o  construct 
tlie idea of mana? What aroused in their minds the idea 
of an impersonal force is, in Professor Durkheim’s view, 
society. The totem is at once the emblem of the god and 
of the society. It means that  god and society are one, and 
that  the god of the clan is the clan itself. 
Social relations thus furnish all that  is necessary to 
awaken in men’s minds the sense of the divine. The 
relation of tlie individual t o  society is one of dependence 
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similar to that of worshippers with their gods. Society 
pursues ends which are not those of the individual, and 
it demands that the individual should sacrifice his own 
interests. It requires him to surrender his desires and 
sometimes his life, and he obeys. He has for it a feeling 
of respect which prevents him from doing what it forbids. 
Further, society has on the individual a strengthening and 
vitalizing influence which is not a,lways easy to detect but 
which is real. When a man is in communion of thought 
with his fellowmen he has increased confidence in himself. 
If he does his duty, he finds in the manifestations of esteem 
or affection a feeling of comfort, and the sentiments of his 
fellowmen towards him increase his self-respect. We 
owe to  society the gifts which create civilization. Towards 
these forces which we feel confusedly in the world about 
us, our feelings are different from those awakened by 
ordinary and material things. There are in us two kinds 
of feelings, and there exist for us two kinds of realities- 
the world of sacred things and the world of profane things. 
Society itself makes things sacred by the respect which it 
requires for certain words and persons, and the care which 
it takes to ensure that they are respected. The Australian 
clan is better able than a more progressive society to  awaken 
in the mind an idea of the divine. The native is more 
closely dependent than the civilized man on his social 
group. The life of Australian societies goes through two 
very different periods-ne of dispersion, when everyone 
is occupied with hunting and fishing and there are no 
religious ceremonies, and one of concentration, when the 
clan assembles itself and lives the most intense social life. 
There is singing, dancing, howling ; the native passes out 
of himself and believes himself to be transported into 
another world. This period cannot last very long, and 
the man returns to a calm and stagnant life again. Out 
of this contrast arises t.he opposition between the sacred 
and the profane life, between sacred and profane things. 
We here touch the bottom of Professor Durkheim’s theory. 
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What religion in all its forms worships is society. The 
distinction between the sacred and the profane is a social 
creation. Society itself is the god. It awakens in men’s 
minds ideas of forces superior to  man, transcendent in a 
sense, but also immanent. This theory gives religion a 
real foundation and explains it without treating it as a 
mere illusion. 
It remains to  be shown how this theory explains the 
ideas of souls of spirits and of gods, for if these ideas are 
not at the basis of totemism, they nevertheless exist along 
with it. From an analysis of the beliefs about the soul 
which he finds among the Australians (doctrines of rein- 
carnation), Professor Durkheim concludes that the soul is 
only a part of the totemic principle, some mana individualized 
and incarnated in a particular man. The ideas of gods 
and of spirits have a similar explanation. The spirits of 
ancestors are conceived in the same way as individual souls 
whose existence they help to  explain. The great god of the 
tribe is only a more important ancestral spirit. Totemism 
has thus a real unity in its complexity. It prepares the 
way for the religions by which it has been supplanted. 
The latter part of Professor Durkheim’s book is devoted 
to  a study of the primitive cult in its principal ceremonies. 
His aim is to discover the characteristic attitudes adopted 
by primitive man in the celebration of his cult. This 
study enables Professor Durkheim to control the results 
to  which he has been led. He dwells again on the fact 
that society is the source of sacred things. The periodic 
rites revive and recall to  memory the collective sense 
and invigorate it. We cannot follow Professor Durkheim 
through the long analysis of the forms of the primitive cult. 
We can only note that he distinguishes a negative cult, 
consisting of a system of prohibitions and ascetic rites, and 
a positive cult, in the ceremonies of which the beginnings of 
the ritual which is to  have a large place in more advanced 
religions are to be found-the offerings and the communion 
meal. 
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There is one side of the book of which little has thus 
far been said-the part which deals with the problem of 
knowledge. As he proceeds in his study, Professor Durk- 
heim shows the religious origin of one category after 
another. His chapter on the cosmology of totemism helps 
him to  explain how the idea of class has a religious origin. 
With regard to  the idea of muna, for instance, he shows that 
the idea of religious force is the prototype of the general 
idea of force. In speaking of the soul, he explains how 
the category of personality took shape. In describing 
the imitative rites employed to  assure the fertility of the 
species, he shows the emergence of the principle of causality 
and of the idea of power. He thereby reaches the con- 
clusion tha t  logic and conceptual thought have their origin 
in society, and that the categories are the expression of 
social things. 
We may now inquire how far Durkheim has achieved 
his object of giving religion a solid basis and of explaining 
it without reducing it to  a mere illusion. Is the society 
which we worship the real society, the defects and im- 
perfections of which we know so well ? Professor Durk- 
heim is prepared to accept an affirmative answer. All the 
vices have had their divinity, and Satan or the anti-god 
is an essential part of religion. But if the society which is 
worshipped is, as seems more probable, the ideal society, 
this idealization may be regarded as a natural product of 
the social life and can be easily explained by the idealiza- 
tion of the collective life. There is no mystery in it. 
Society is consequently the only basis of religion. 
The position adopted by Durkheim is deserving of 
attention. Instead of treating religion as false and regarding 
it as purely illusory, he admits that there must be something 
in it, and this lends an interest to his theory. In recognizing 
religion to  be a reality, Durkheim places himself in opposi- 
tion to many thinkers who are openly hostile to him, and 
this is true also of his recognition that it is a force. He 
sees that in all religions the worshipper seeks and finds a 
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greater force, a feeling of comfort and strength for which 
he prays t o  his divinity. Having performed certain rites 
and ceremonies he feels stronger. Religion (that is to  say, 
for Professor Durkheim, society) has on man a strengthening 
and vitalizing influence. For Professor Durkheim it is a 
fact that  religion helps man, and that the need of help 
and of force lies at its root. He is no foe t o  religion, and 
this serious attempt on the part of a man who is not himself 
a believer to understand the meaning of religion is both 
interesting and important. 
Neverthe- 
less we cannot accept the author’s conclusions, and must 
subject his theory t o  criticism. First as regards his method, 
can we judge an institution by its origin ? Must we not see 
all that it has become as well as its humble beginnings? 
Professor Durkheim himself says (p. 97) that  in order t o  
understand an  institution ‘ it is frequently well t o  follow it 
into the advanced stages of its evolution, for sometimes 
it is only when it  is fully developed that its real significa- 
tion appears with the greatest clearness.’ Is not this true 
of religion ? The study of its elementary forms is not 
without difficulties. We find ourselves confronted with 
rites, beliefs and ceremonies forming a confused whole, 
where i t  is not always easy to  distinguish the essential 
characteristics of religion. ‘As  long as men are still 
making their first steps in the ar t  of expressing their 
thought,’ says Professor Durkheim himself, ‘ i t  is not easy 
for t h e  observer to perceive tha t  which moves them, for 
there is nothing t o  translate clearly that which passes in 
thcse obscure minds, which have only a confused and 
ephemeral knowledge of themselves’ (p. 96). There is a 
risk, we may venture t o  suggest, of interpreting the facts 
in the light of the inquirers’ own ideas, and of regarding 
as essential elements what has been considered a priori to 
be such. Professor Durklieini starts with a preliminary 
definition. But he uses i t  in more than one place as if i t  
were tlic last result of tiis study. He gives i t  a doctrinal 
His book is rich in interesting observations. 
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value, whereas its professed purpose was the smaller one 
of making clearer the distinction between religious and 
non-religious things. In  this opposition between sacred 
and profane things we already see the social opposed to 
the individual as something absolutely heterogeneous, and 
we may well ask whether the totemic cult was not selected 
by the author because it offered an easy explanation and 
verification of this opposition. 
The crucial point in Professor Durkheim’s theory is 
the point where he introduces the idea of muna or totemic 
principle. It may reasonably be asked whether the idea of 
muna is in reality in its origin as totemic and as dependent 
upon society as Professor Durkheim makes it out to  be. 
This force diffused through the whole universe seems rather 
to be of a cosmic character. Society is undoubtedly more 
powerhl than man, but nature is still more powerful, 
and society, especially as it exists among clans and primi- 
tive tribes, is very dependent on its natural environment. 
When Professor Durkheim says in his chapter on the 
Cosmology of Totemism that the Australian ‘looks upon 
the universe as the great tribe to  one of whose divisions 
he himself belongs’ (p. lal) ,  and that all known things 
belong to  the tribe, is he speaking in more than a figurative 
sense ? The importance of society, which is real but 
inferior, seems to  be exaggerated. At all events, this 
exaggeration is obvious in Professor Durkheim’s theory of 
knowledge. Human thought for him is wholly derived 
from religion, that is t o  say, from society. The influence 
of society in the formation of concepts cannot be denied, 
but alongside of religious thought there was from the 
beginning secular thought. Man had to  live, and i t  seems 
probable that the idea of causality, for example, arose 
more out of this practical need than from the imitative 
rites employed to assure the fertility of the totemic species. 
Thought as a whole comes from tlie whole mind, and it 
would not be difficult to  find in Professor Durkheim’s pages 
acknowledgment of the existence of individual factors 
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besides those that are collective. In their origin, art, 
religion and science were closely intermingled, All had a 
religious colouring. But this does not mean that religion 
produced everything and created art and science. Pro- 
fessor Durkheim exaggerates the part played by society 
in the origin of religion and in the problem of knowledge. 
With regard to  mana, its origin must be regarded as different 
from totemic ideas. The question therefore is whether 
the religious character is due to  the totem or to  mam. 
Does the totem give mana its religious character or vice 
versa ? It is possible to  hold the second theory, and Belot 
in the Revue Philosophique, May 1913, shows that a theory 
taking the idea of mana as its basis may be adopted and 
maintained as well as that of Professor Durkheim. Thus 
the basis of the latter’s theory appears to  be narrow and 
inconsistent. For this reason his book, which represents 
an important contribution to the study of religion, does 
not speak the last word regarding its origin. Society is a 
factor of great importance, but it cannot explain the 
origin of religion, nor does it suffice to  provide a solid 
groundwork for the reality of things. 
To sum up, from the point of view of a believer, this 
volume does not fulfil its aim. The theory does away with 
religion and ultimately denies it. If God is the society 
in the midst of which we live, and if this society is so im- 
perfect and so wicked, what spiritual help can we find in 
Him ? If the sociological interpretation of prayer and of 
communion is true, we can no longer pray, and soon all 
religion will die. Like naturism and animism, the theory 
which regards religion as the mythical representation of a 
reality already known in the end destroys religion.’ 
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